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Abstract Mental states—such as thinking, remembering,
or feeling angry, happy, or dizzy—have a clear internal
component. We feel a certain way when we are in these
states. These internal experiences may be simulated when
people understand conceptual references to mental states.
However, mental states can also be described from an
“external” perspective, for example when referring to
“smiling.” In those cases, simulation of visible outside
features may be more relevant for understanding. In a
switching costs paradigm, we presented semantically
unrelated sentences describing emotional and nonemotional
mental states while manipulating their internal or external
focus. The results show that switching costs occur when
participants shift between sentences with an internal and an
external focus. This suggests that different forms of
simulation underlie understanding these sentences. In
addition, these effects occurred for emotional and nonemo-
tional mental states, suggesting that they are grounded in a
similar way—through the process of simulation.
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Everyday language contains many words that refer to
people’s mental states, such as anger, doubt, exhaustion,
or recognition. How do we understand such concepts?
Grounded cognition theories suggest that conceptual
understanding involves the mental simulation of sensory
states (Barsalou, 1999; Gallese & Lakoff, 2005). On this
account, the representation of abstract concepts, including
mental states, involves complex, multimodal simulations.
The link between understanding mental states and simu-
lation has mostly been explored through studies of
emotion concepts (Glenberg, Webster, Mouilso, Havas, &
Lindeman, 2009; Havas, Glenberg, & Rinck, 2007;
Niedenthal, 2007; Niedenthal, Winkielman, Mondillon,
& Vermeulen, 2009; Oosterwijk, Rotteveel, Fischer, &
Hess, 2009; Oosterwijk, Topper, Rotteveel, & Fischer,
2010; Wicker et al., 2003; for a review, see Winkielman,
Niedenthal, & Oberman, 2008). In the present research,
we move beyond emotion concepts and explore the role of
simulation in understanding nonemotional as well as
emotional terms. More importantly, though, we explore a
novel issue concerning the role of mental perspective in
multimodal simulation. Specifically, we compare a focus
on internal properties of mental states (i.e., properties
accessible through introspection) with a focus on external
properties of mental states (i.e., properties accessible
through vision).
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One type of simulation that is relevant to mental states is
the simulation of internal experiences. After all, we feel
something when we are angry, exhausted, experience a sense
of familiarity, or struggle to recall an event. Internal
experiences include introspections (i.e., subjective experi-
ences resulting from self-reflection), interoceptive states (i.e.,
sensations from the body), and experiences that comprise the
general term “affect.” Several experiments support the idea
that internal experiences characterize mental states, including
emotions (e.g., anger, joy, fear), visceral states (e.g., hunger,
dizziness), and states classically seen as cognitive (e.g.,
familiarity, intuition, thinking). For instance, thinking and
recalling can feel easy or difficult, as reflected in subjective
ratings and physiological indices of effort (Schwarz & Clore,
2007; von Helversen, Gendolla, Winkielman, & Schmidt,
2008). Furthermore, valence and arousal are seen as intrinsic
parts of perception (Barrett & Bar, 2009; Barrett & Bliss-
Moreau, 2009), recognition (Winkielman & Cacioppo,
2001), and memory (Phaf & Rotteveel, 2005). Consequently,
understanding language that describes mental states from an
internal perspective, such as the sentence he retrieved the
memory from his mind, may involve simulation of internal
experiences.
Nevertheless, mental states can also be described from
an external perspective. Exhaustion or anger, for example,
are associated with external manifestations on the face
(frown) or body (clenched fists)—information that is “on
the outside.” A focus on external components may
therefore involve the simulation of relevant visual features.
Thus, for instance, understanding the sentence contempt
was showing on his face may invoke an external perspec-
tive and, consequently, a visual simulation.
In short, simulation of mental states may be different
depending on the context in which the mental state is situated
(Barsalou, Niedenthal, Barbey, & Ruppert, 2003). When a
mental state is described in terms of internal experiences,
simulation of introspectively accessible features may be
relevant for understanding. When a mental state is described
in terms of external, expressive manifestations, however,
simulation in the visual system may be more relevant.
The idea that language can invoke different perspectives
that guide simulations relevant for understanding has been
explored concerning spatial perspective. Several studies
demonstrated that language comprehension involves a
spatial situation model, a mental representation of the
linguistically described situation that includes spatial
information such as distances and relative positions
between elements. In a spatial situation model, attention is
focused at specific locations. Thus, a person who compre-
hends language has a mental simulation of the situation in
which he or she is an observer from a particular spatial
perspective (Morrow, Greenspan, & Bower, 1987; see
Bower & Morrow, 1990; and Zwaan & Radvansky, 1998,
for reviews). Researchers have also shown that object
properties are more accessible if the spatial perspective
allows for perception of the property, as compared to when
it does not. For example, from the simulated perspective of
inside a restaurant, participants were faster to verify that
restaurants have tables than from the perspective of outside
a restaurant (Borghi, Glenberg, & Kaschak, 2004; see also
Brunyé, Ditman, Mahoney, Augustyn, & Taylor, 2009;
Horton & Rapp, 2003; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). In addition,
Spivey and Geng (2001) showed that the perspective of a
story affected the direction of participants’ eye movements,
even though they were looking at a blank screen. Thus,
when participants understand language, they construct a
situation model from a specific perspective.
Building upon previous research on the role of spatial
perspective in comprehension, the present research exam-
ined the novel hypothesis that understanding abstract
concepts, such as mental states, involves simulating internal
experiences or externally observable features, depending on
perspective. This study not only extends the traditional
research on language comprehension, but also the extant
grounded cognition models, which typically focus on motor
actions and the classic sensory modalities (vision, audition,
smell, taste, and touch). In fact, extant models of grounded
cognition at least implicitly assume that what is central for
simulation is some form of perception and action “in the
world” (cf. Wilson, 2002). Two important exceptions are
Barsalou’s (1999) influential article, which explicitly high-
lights the possible role of introspective simulations in the
comprehension of abstract concepts (see also Barsalou &
Wiemer-Hastings, 2005), and simulation accounts that
propose an important role for interoceptive and introspective
simulation in emotion (Bastiaansen, Thioux, & Keysers,
2009; Glenberg et al., 2009; Niedenthal, 2007).
In the present study, we used a switching cost paradigm to
investigate the roles of internal and external focus in
understanding mental states. Previous research has found
switching costs when properties of verified concepts come
from different sensory modalities, rather than from the same
sensory modality (Marques, 2006; Pecher, Zeelenberg, &
Barsalou, 2003; van Dantzig, Pecher, Zeelenberg, & Barsa-
lou, 2008; Vermeulen, Niedenthal, & Luminet, 2007). For
instance, Pecher et al. demonstrated that people verify that an
apple is shiny more quickly after verifying that a flag is
striped than after verifying that an airplane is noisy. This
effect is explained by flexible simulations in the modalities
relevant for verifying the different properties. For example,
in order to verify that an apple is shiny, the conceptual
system will use the visual modality to simulate seeing
an apple, whereas in order to verify that an airplane is
noisy, the conceptual system will use the auditory modality
to simulate hearing an airplane. If these different modality-
specific features are represented by their respective
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sensorimotor systems, a switching cost is predicted
because attention has to switch between different systems
(cf. Spence, Nicholls, & Driver, 2001).
To investigate whether internal and visual forms of
simulation play different roles in understanding mental
states depending on perspective, we contrasted sentences
about mental states that emphasized internal experiences
(internal focus) with sentences that emphasized visual
features (external focus). If mental states are grounded in
simulations that vary with internal or external focus, then
switching costs should occur when people process senten-
ces with different focuses. More specifically, target senten-
ces preceded by prime sentences with the same focus
should be processed faster than target sentences preceded
by prime sentences with a different focus.
In the present study, we presented prime and target
sentences from different domains of experience. That is,
sentences describing mental states from an emotional domain
(e.g., fear, anger, pride, shame) primed sentences describing
mental states from nonemotional domains (e.g., thinking,
remembering, dizziness, hunger), and vice versa. This design
was important for two reasons. First, this method isolates the
effects of focus from other potential similarities between the
sentences. Critically, it is unlikely that emotional states have
strong semantic associations with cognitive and visceral
states, which could explain switching costs. In this way, our
method offers a strong test of the role of internal versus
external focus in sentence comprehension.
Second, using primes and targets from different domains
allowed us to assess the similarity between internal simu-
lations associated with different types of mental states. This is
relevant to a long-standing discussion in psychology about
whether emotion and cognition share processing resources.
Some researchers have argued that processing operations and
neural substrates of emotion are separate from cognition and
other states (Zajonc, 2000). Other views predict overlap in
processing between emotional, cognitive, and visceral
domains, due to the common involvement of internal states
(see Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Pessoa, 2008). If emotion and
cognition truly rely on completely different subprocesses,
then simulating feeling angry would require access to
different resources than retrieving a memory. On this account,
one would not expect additional switching costs for moving
from internal to external focus, because processing prime and
target sentences would always depend on different resources.
If, however, switching costs related to internal and external
focus are observed regardless of the fact that people switch
between the emotional and nonemotional domains, this
would challenge a strong “separationist” view of cognition
and emotion, at least for language comprehension.
In summary, we tested the hypothesis that representa-
tions of mental states can differ according to internal or
external focus. We predicted switching costs for sentences
with different focuses. The occurrence of switching costs in
this design would be a strong test of the hypothesis that
simulation mechanisms that underlie the processing of
sentences with an internal or an external focus are similar
for very different categories of mental states. In other
words, if switching costs are found, this would support a
counterintuitive notion that emotional, cognitive, and
visceral mental states are understood via similar mecha-
nisms of representation.
Method
Participants and design
In total, 169 students from the University of California, San
Diego (UCSD), participated for course credit. The experiment
had a 2 x 2 x 2 design. The first two factors were varied within
participants, manipulating internal versus external focus
(target focus) and same versus different focus (switching).
The third factor was varied between participants, manipulat-
ing whether emotion sentences served as primes and
nonemotion sentences as targets, or vice versa (order).
Stimulus materials
We created 200 sensible sentences referring to 10 emotional
states (i.e., guilt, shame, disappointment, sadness, fear, anger,
disgust, pride, happiness, and love) and 10 nonemotional
states (i.e., meditation, dizziness, intuition, doubt, hunger,
thinking, remembering, tired, puzzled, and visualization) and
varied the internal or external focus of these sentences. The
total set consisted of the following four subsets: 50 non-
emotion sentences with internal focus (He was famished by
the end of the race. The phone number came back to her in a
flash.), 50 nonemotion sentences with external focus (She
shook her head in doubt. After spinning she lost her
balance.), 50 emotion sentences with internal focus (Hot
embarrassment came over her. Being at the party filled her
with happiness.), and 50 emotion sentences with external
focus (His nose wrinkled with disgust. She lowered her head
with disappointment.). Internal and external sentences incor-
porated the same, previously specified, set of 10 abstract
concepts in order to ensure that sentences with different
focuses did not differ in terms of the mental states they
described. A full listing of the sentences can be found online
in the Supplementary Materials.
In a separate norming study, 51 students from UCSD
provided ratings for the sentences. Approximately half
of the participants rated the sentences on internal focus
(n = 23), and the remaining participants rated the
sentences on external focus (n = 28). Internal/external
focus was introduced as “the extent to which a sentence
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describes internal/external aspects of an experience.” For
internal focus, it was emphasized that internal aspects of
experiences can only be observed by the person himself,
whereas for external focus it was emphasized that external
aspects can be observed by outsiders. Internal and external
focus were rated on a scale from 1 (no internal/external
focus at all) to 5 (very high in internal/external focus).
As can be seen in Table 1, rated internal focus was
significantly higher for sentences that were created to
produce internal focus as compared to sentences that were
created to produce external focus. This effect was present
for both the emotion sentences, t(22) = 5.43, p < .001, and
the nonemotion sentences, t(22) = 6.44, p < .001. Rated
external focus, on the other hand, was significantly higher
for sentences that were created to produce external focus as
compared to sentences that were created to produce internal
focus. This effect was present for both emotion sentences,
t(27) = 8.81, p < .001, and nonemotion sentences, t(27) =
9.52, p < .001. In short, the norming study established that
the emotional and nonemotional sentences used in the main
experiment indeed produced the intended external and
internal focuses.
Procedure
In the main experiment, we randomly combined the 200
normed sentences to form prime–target pairs. The resulting
100 experimental pairs were crossed on the same–different
dimension and the external–internal dimension, creating four
groups (i.e., internal–internal, external–internal, external–
external, and internal–external). Prime and target sentences
were fully counterbalanced over groups, and sentences in
different groups were matched on length. In addition, we also
fully counterbalanced the content of the prime and target
sentences within the experimental pairs in terms of the mental
states described in the sentences. Emotion sentences and
nonemotion sentences served either as targets or primes. Half
of the participants were presented with the emotion sentences
as primes and the nonemotion sentences as targets, and the
other half were presented with the nonemotion sentences as
primes and the emotion sentences as targets.
As in previous research with sentences, participants were
asked to judge sensibility (Glenberg & Kaschak, 2002). The
experiment consisted of trials presenting sensible sentences
and trials presenting nonsensible sentences (The curtains
were dry with fear.). Participants made judgments about the
sensibility of these sentences using the “sensible” (m) or the
“nonsensible” (z) key. To balance the numbers of sensible
and nonsensible responses and to obscure the fact that the
experimental sentences were systematically paired, we
mixed the 200 experimental sentences with 400 filler
sentences. These filler sentences were combined into 50
sensible–nonsensible, 50 nonsensible–sensible, and 100
nonsensible–nonsensible filler pairs.
Participants first completed 12 practice trials, followed by
300 experimental trials. Every trial started with a fixation
stimulus (*****) presented for 500 ms, followed by the prime
sentence. The prime sentence was removed from the screen
when the participant gave a response or after 4,500 ms. After a
1,000-ms interstimulus interval, the fixation stimulus was
presented again, followed by the target sentence. The target
sentence remained on screen until a response was made (but
no longer than 4,500 ms). Response times (RTs) were
measured from the onset of the target sentence. Participants
received feedback if they made an error (“incorrect”) or
responded more slowly than 4,500 ms (“too slow”).
Before data analysis, we excluded participants who
made more than 20% errors (23 participants, or 14%),
indicating that they were not performing the task as
instructed or had poor reading skills. The analyses were
performed on the remaining 146 participants. It is important
to note that we chose this stringent exclusion rate
considering the fact that 37% of UCSD students do not
speak English as their native language (www.ucsd.edu/
explore/about/facts.html). Nonetheless, an exclusion rate
that omitted only those people who made 35% errors or
more (leaving out 6 participants) did not change the pattern
of our results. Mean RTs were computed for each condition.
RTs for trials with incorrect responses to a prime or target
sentence or RTs more than three standard deviations from
the participant’s mean were excluded.
Results
We predicted that participants would be faster to judge
subsequently presented unrelated sentences within the same
focus (internal–internal or external–external focus) than
across focuses (internal–external or external–internal). This
prediction was tested by a repeated measures ANOVA on
the RTs with switching (switch, no switch), target focus
(internal, external) and target emotional status (emotional,
nonemotional) as within-subjects factors. Most importantly,
this ANOVA showed the expected switching effect,
Table 1 Internal and external focus ratings for the eight different
sentence categories (standard deviations are in parentheses)
Rating Dimension Sentence Focus Sentence Category
Emotion Nonemotion
Internal Internal 4.4 (0.38) 3.7 (0.66)
External 3.7 (0.82) 2.8 (0.62)
External Internal 2.2 (0.73) 1.8 (0.61)
External 3.7 (0.59) 3.7 (0.67)
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F(1, 144) = 6.51, p = .01, ηp
2 = .04. RTs to nonswitch trials
(M = 1,673 ms) were faster than RTs to switch trials (M =
1,696 ms). The interaction between switching (switch, no
switch) and target focus (internal, external) was not
significant, F(1, 144) < 1, p = .87. This indicates that the
switching effect was equally strong for targets with an
internal and with an external focus (see Table 2). We were
also interested in whether emotional or nonemotional
sentences differed in their ability to prime focus. Although
numerically the switching effect was larger for nonemo-
tional targets (31 ms) than for emotional targets (16 ms), the
interaction between switching and the emotional status of
the target sentences was not statistically significant, F(1,
144) < 1, p = .41.
In addition, the repeated measures ANOVA on the
RTs showed a main effect of target focus, F(1, 144) =
20.74, p < .001, ηp
2 = .13, and a significant interaction
between target focus and the emotional status of the target
sentences, F(1, 144) = 7.94, p < .01, ηp
2 = .05. These effects
are theoretically irrelevant and may reflect slight differences
in linguistic properties between different types of sentences.
A repeated measures ANOVA on the error rates did not
show a switching cost effect, F(1, 144) = 0.88, p = .35. There
was, however, a theoretically uninteresting significant inter-
action between target focus and the emotional status of the
target sentences, F(1, 144) = 19.50, p < .001, ηp
2 = .12.
Discussion
The present study demonstrated that sentences describing
internal aspects of mental states were judged more quickly
when primed with sentences with the same focus (internal)
than when primed with sentences with a different focus
(external). A similar switching effect was present for
sentences with an external focus. The advantage of our
design was that these results are hard to explain by
differences in semantic similarity between sentences with
the same focus and with different focuses, because the
prime and target sentences refer to experiences in different
domains (emotional or nonemotional). Therefore, in our
view, the switch in perspective between internal and
external focus is a more likely explanation than one based
on semantic similarity.
The presence of switching costs suggests that language
about both emotional and nonemotional mental states can
be understood from at least two different perspectives. By
highlighting the contrast between internal and external
perspectives, the present findings extend previous work on
the role of perspective in language comprehension, which
explored how people construct different perspectives when
understanding external events (Borghi et al., 2004; Brunyé
et al., 2009; Horton & Rapp, 2003; Morrow et al., 1987;
Spivey & Geng, 2001; Wu & Barsalou, 2009). Moreover,
by introducing an internal perspective, the present findings
extend previous work on switching effects that has mainly
focused on the classic sensory modalities (Marques, 2006;
Pecher et al., 2003; van Dantzig et al., 2008; but see
Vermeulen et al., 2007).
In accordance with theories of grounded cognition, we
propose that internal and external sentences are understood
through simulation in different systems (Barsalou, 1999;
Glenberg & Robertson, 2000). While sentences with an
external focus may be understood predominantly by
Mental State (Target Sentence) Focus (Target Sentence)
Internal External
RT PE RT PE
Emotional
No switch 1,630 (305) 7.95 (6.1) 1,639 (347) 6.74 (6.5)
Switch 1,639 (313) 8.00 (6.2) 1,661 (322) 6.37 (5.8)
Switching cost 9 0.05 22 −0.37
Nonemotional
No switch 1,679 (352) 6.23 (5.4) 1,745 (357) 9.26 (5.5)
Switch 1,713 (339) 6.29 (4.7) 1,772 (354) 7.83 (5.9)
Switching cost 34 0.06 27 −1.43
Total
No switch 1,654 (328) 7.12 (5.8) 1,690 (355) 7.94 (6.2)
Switch 1,675 (327) 7.18 (5.6) 1,714 (341) 7.07 (5.9)
Switching cost 21 0.06 24 −0.87
Table 2 Mean reaction times in
milliseconds (RT) and percent
errors (PE) for sensibility judg-
ments in nonswitch and switch
conditions, split for emotional
and nonemotional target senten-
ces with internal or external
focus (standard deviations are in
parentheses)
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simulations in visual systems, sentences with an internal
focus may be understood predominantly by simulations in
systems associated with internal experiences. Consequently,
the present results may be interpreted as support for
Barsalou’s (1999) proposal that simulations of introspective
states play an important role in understanding abstract
mental concepts (see also Barsalou & Wiemer-Hastings,
2005). In addition, highlighting the role of internal
experiences is also important, as some embodiment theories
tend to focus on perception and action “in the world,”
without explicitly acknowledging the roles that attention
and perception of internal events may play in concept
representation (for discussion, see Wilson, 2002).
Most concepts, including abstract concepts, involve a mix
of different modalities (see, e.g., van Dantzig, Cowell,
Zeelenberg, & Pecher, 2011). For example, consider the
emotion anger; anger is associated with internal experiences
(e.g., high arousal, raised body temperature, sense of
urgency) and external features (e.g., clenched fists, frown,
red face). As such, both internal and external simulations
could underlie understanding of this concept (see also
Niedenthal et al., 2009). This is consistent with the ratings
we collected for our sentences, indicating that these were not
exclusively internal or external. Hence, the complete
simulation that accompanies sentence understanding may
be multimodal. Nevertheless, the switching cost found in the
present study suggests that within this mix of modalities,
more attention may be given to simulations in contextually
relevant modalities than to those in contextually irrelevant
modalities. We propose that the internal or external focus of
the presently used sentences drew attention to internal or
external components of the presented concepts, which
resulted in dominance of the relevant modalities in the
simulation (see also Connell & Lynott, 2009).
The present study demonstrated switching costs even
though prime and target sentences always described
mental states from different domains. This finding
points out important similarities in the simulations that
underlie the understanding of conceptual references to
emotional and nonemotional mental states (Barsalou et
al., 2003). Most importantly, even though our results
leave open the possibility of more specialized introspec-
tive subprocesses, as suggested by Barsalou (1999), we
show that at least some aspects of internal simulation are
similar across emotional, cognitive, and visceral domains.
Consequently, our findings challenge a view in which
cognitive, emotional, and visceral mental states are
seen as processes that can be strictly separated. In
contrast, our findings are consistent with several recent
studies that have highlighted the neural overlap of
emotional and nonemotional circuitry in the brain
(Duncan & Barrett, 2007; Lindquist, Wager, Kober,
Bliss-Moreau, & Barrett, in press; Pessoa, 2008). Notably,
our findings also support the premise that internal
experiences (or affect) are a common “ingredient” of all
mental events (Barrett, 2009).
Furthermore, our findings are relevant to the recent
suggestion by Craig (2002, 2009) that the anterior insular
cortex (AIC), a brain region associated with interoception
and feeling states, might be involved in processing of many
different mental experiences, varying from basic visceral
states (pain, coldness, hunger) to emotional states (disgust,
anger, sadness) and cognitive states (sudden insight, feeling
of knowing). Hence, an interesting and important avenue
for further research will be to test whether understanding
sentences describing internal components of emotional and
nonemotional mental states is accompanied by increased
activity in the AIC. Such a finding would be an important
addition to brain-imaging studies that have reported activity
in “classic” modality-specific areas when people verify
perceptual properties of concepts (Goldberg, Perfetti, &
Schneider, 2006; Kan, Barsalou, Solomon, Minor, &
Thompson-Schill, 2003).
In short, our findings highlight two important points.
First, switching between sentences about mental states
with internal and external focus has processing costs.
This finding emphasizes the importance of perspective
in simulations of mental states. Second, although
important aspects of diverse mental states—such as
anger, exhaustion, and remembering—are processed
uniquely, their processing may rely on a shared
simulation mechanism. This mechanism allows us to
grasp mental states from inside out.
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